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How does participating or upgrading in the global value chains (GVCs) affect wage in-
equality between skilled and unskilled labor within firms? In this paper, we develop a trade
model of heterogeneous firms with intermediate trade and various skill inputs, in which we
apply the fair wage hypothesis to predict changes in the wage premium as a result of partici-
pating or upgrading in GVCs. The model predicts that increasing participation in GVCs, as
measured by the share of foreign value-added content in exports (FVAR), improves a firm’s
profits and amplifies the wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labor. Moreover,
moving to upstream sectors in GVCs, as measured by the exporting varieties’ upstream-
ness (or average distance from final use), raises a firm’s wage premium by increasing the
productivity of skilled workers. Using detail Chinese firm-level data from 2000 to 2006,
we develop a Miner-type empirical model to study the wage premium changes associated
with FVAR and upstreamness. We find robust empirical evidence that China’s FVAR is
positively associated with skill wage premium within firms. We also observe that Chinese
firms with higher upstreamness in GVCs tend to have larger wage inequality with more
skilled workforces. (JEL code: F12; F16; F66)





The recent years have seen a dramatic rise of the global value chains (GVCs), in which
each country specializes in several stages of production and cooperates to produce the final
goods [OECD (2014)]. The international fragmentation in GVCs is also known as the second
“unbundling” of production [Baldwin (2006)], which allow firms to use more imported inter-
mediates for production. The extent of the firms’ vertical specialization in GVCs is measured
by the ratio of foreign value-added content in exports relative to total exports (FVAR)1. As
suggested by the recent literature, most countries have a rising level FVAR after deepening
their participation in GVCs [Vries et al. (2014), Koopman et al. (2014), Johnson and Noguera
(2012a), Los et al. (2015)].
As one of the largest export markets with abundant labor resource, China plays an essential
role in global production. Despite its deep engagement in GVCs, however, a trend of rising
levels of FVAR is not observed in China. In fact, recent evidence suggested that the average
FVAR of Chinese firms declined from 35% in 2000 to 30% in 2007, which is the opposite of
most countries participating in GVCs2 [Kee and Tang (2016)]. The decline of FVAR in China
is partly due to the substitution of domestic materials for imported intermediates by Chinese
processing firms[Kee and Tang (2016)].The substitution of domestic materials has changed
the demands for domestic skills, which have important implications on domestic labor market
[Vries et al. (2014)]. The impacts of globalization on employment and wage inequality have
been extensively studied by many studies [Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007), Helpman (2016),
Pavcnik (2017)], but few of them are focused on the impacts of GVC activities on wage in-
equality, especially at the firm level. In this paper, we quantify the participation and position of
firms in GVCs and explore how participating and upgrading in GVCs affect the wage inequality
of skills within Chinese manufacturing firms.
1The recently available international input and output tables enable us to decompose gross trade into multiple
value-added terms by origins and destinations. The share of domestic value-added in gross exports is defined
as DVAR, which estimates the domestic contribution to exports. The share of foreign value-added in exports is
defined as FVAR, which measures the extent of international fragmentation across borders. At the aggregated
level, DVAR+FVAR = 1
2Koopman et al. (2014) found the trend of declining FVAR in China using the international input and output
tables. Upward et al. (2013) confirmed the decline of FVAR using the Chinese firm-level data.
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To undertake this, we include both skilled and unskilled workers as inputs in a trade model
of heterogeneous firms and then we seek to explain variations in firms’ wage premiums in
terms of changes in their GVC activities. These GVC activities, in particular, include using
imported intermediates for the production of exports (measured by the share of foreign value-
added in exports, FVAR), and moving up to more upstream sectors in GVCs (measured by
the upstreamness of firms in GVCs). In this model, we follow the setup of Melitz (2003)
and further apply the fair wage hypothesis of Amiti and Davis (2011) in order to tie the wage
premium to firms’ performance [Chen et al. (2017)]. The fair wage hypothesis assumes that
workers determine their efforts by the difference between the real wage and the reference (fair)
wage with respect to their efforts [Egger and Kreickemeier (2009)]. Workers in more profitable
firms would expect higher fair wages [Egger et al. (2013)]. Thus, in equilibrium, profitable
firms tend to give high wages to workers to elicit their efforts [Egger and Kreickemeier (2012),
Egger et al. (2013)]. We further assume that skilled workers have more bargaining power than
unskilled workers according to firms’ performance3. Profitable firms tend to have a large wage
premium of skills [Chen et al. (2017)]. In the model, firms make decisions on participating
in GVCs by overcoming the sunk costs of entering import and export markets. Only firms
with higher productivity or larger scales are able to participate in GVCs by importing foreign
intermediates for the production of exports. Similar to Amiti and Davis (2011), GVC firms
tend to be more profitable and pay higher wages to the skilled workers than firms which failed
to enter the GVCs. Moreover, firms with a larger share of foreign value-added in exports
(FVAR) tend to have higher profits and wider wage inequality between skilled and unskilled
workers. Moving to upstream sectors in GVCs needs higher productivity of skilled workers,
which improves firms’ profits and widens the wage inequality of skills.
We examine the predictions of the model with Chinese firm-level data from 2000 to 2006.
The firm-level GVC participation and position indexes are measured by the Chinese enterprise
3The assumption that skilled labor has a larger bargaining power on wages than unskilled workers follows
Chen et al. (2017). The assumption is consistent with the predictions of bargaining model by Helpman et al.
(2010) where firms with higher value added have more surplus to share among specific skill groups. Chen et al.
(2017) also discussed the possibility that the skilled and unskilled labor have the same bargaining power in wages
but it is skilled workers who gain more additional surpluses. In this paper, we assume that only skilled workers
have the bargaining power in wages to simplify the model, but the predictions with the equal bargaining power of
both skills should keep robust.
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survey data combined with transactional-level customs data. This dataset enables us to es-
timate the firm-level data value-added trade, which is different from the approach of recent
literature that used the international input-output tables (IIOTs) to decompose the value-added
terms of gross exports [Johnson and Noguera (2012a), Koopman et al. (2012), Koopman et al.
(2014)]. Despite the advantage of capturing global input-output structure across borders and
sectors, the value-added approach using IIOTs estimates the value-added trade at the aggregated
level, which assumed that all firms within a sector use the same ratio of imported intermediates
for production [INOMATA (2017)]. In fact, firms are heterogeneous in GVCs. For example,
processing exporters tend to use a higher proportion of imported intermediates than ordinary
exporters. Thus, in some developing countries with prominent processing trade (e.g., China,
Vietnam, Philippines, etc.), the oversampling of processing firms in the construction of IIOTs
leads to aggregation biases in the estimation of DVAR and FVAR [Koopman et al. (2012), Kee
and Tang (2016)].
As noted, this paper embraces firm heterogeneity in value-added trade. The firm-level GVC
participation index is measured by the share of foreign value-added content in exports (FVAR),
which captures the extent of firms’ participation in GVCs through backward production link-
ages4. We measure the firms’ position in GVCs by the upstreamness index, which represents
the ”distances” of firms’ outputs to the final demands in the international input-output tables
(IIOTs). The more stages the output takes to reach the final use, the more upstream it is located
in a GVC and the higher is the index value. As noted, we find that firms in China show a
decline trend in FVAR between 2000 and 2006, which is consistent to the firm-level analysis
results from Kee and Tang (2016) and Upward et al. (2013) and conclusions of I-O approach by
Koopman et al. (2014) and Johnson and Noguera (2012a). We also observe a rising value of the
average upstreamness index value for Chinese manufacturing firms,indicating the upgrading of
Chinese firms from downstream sectors to upstream sectors in GVCs [Antràs et al. (2012)].
4Koopman et al. (2014) defined the backward GVC participation index as the share of foreign value-added in
exports. He also defined the forward GVC participation index as the share of domestic value added in exports of
third countries. The firm-level FVAR is measured following the procedures of Kee and Tang (2016) and Upward
et al. (2013).
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Our interest is to study the impacts of GVC activities on skill wage inequality at the firm
level. There have been many studies focusing on the wage inequality of skills at the country-
level, within sectors, and across firms. However, there are very few studies on the wage in-
equality within firms, especially for China5. One major obstacle of investigating the wage
inequality within Chinese firms is lack of direct measurement of skilled wage and unskilled
wage. To overcome this problem, in this paper, we develop a Mincer-type econometric frame-
work to construct the firm-level wage premium according to the average wage of two skill
groups and their skill share using the data of Chinese manufacturing firms from 2000 to 20066.
This approach makes up the data limitation of Chinese firm-level wage by skills [Chen et al.
(2017)]. We introduce measures of firm-level GVC participation and GVC position into the
empirical specification as predictors of wage inequality.We find two key results. First, we find
that the FVAR of Chinese manufacturing firms was associated positively with the higher wage
premiums with the employment of more skilled workers within firms7. Second, we find that
the upgrading of firms in GVCs, as measured by an increase in the upstreamness index, widens
the wage inequality with more skilled workforces.
One primary challenge in this paper is the possible endogenous nexus between GVC partic-
ipation and firms’ wage inequality. As we know, not every firm participates in GVCs. Recent
studies found that the GVC firms are more productive with larger scales and higher profits
than the non-GVC firms [Baldwin et al. (2014)]8. Similar to exports, firms with better eco-
nomic performance are more likely to overcome the sunk costs of integration and self-select
5Verhoogen (2008) and Galiani and Sanguinetti (2003) found trade liberalization increased skill wage premium
in Mexican and Argentinean firms, but limited studies explored the firm-level wage inequality of China due to data
limitation. Li and Xu (2008) observed an increasing trend of wage inequality of skills within firms using a small
survey sample. Chen et al. (2017) studied the firm-level wage inequality changes in response to input trade
liberalization and found a rising skill wage inequality within Chinese manufacturing firms.
6In the Mincer-type wage equation, the average wage of a firm is the average wage of skilled labor and unskilled
labor weighted by the skill share of labor. Following Chen et al. (2017), after the logarithm transformation, the
average wage is determined by the firms’ wage premium, their skill share and the wage of unskilled labor.Average
firm-level wage is available in the Chinese Manufacturing Survey data during the sample period. However, the
share of skilled labor in total employment (skill share) at the firm level is only available for 2004. We provide
more details on how to construct the measured employment share of skills at the firm level following Chen et al.
(2017) in section 3.
7The declining FVAR in China tended to reduce the wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers
with the lower share of skilled workforces.
8Similar evidence can also be found in studies about offshoring firms and non-offshoring firms [Antras and
Helpman (2004), Geishecker and Görg (2008), Wagner (2011)].
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into GVCs. The self-selection effect of firms in participating GVCs may lead to biased esti-
mation [Antras and Helpman (2004)]. To address the challenge, a Heckman two-step selection
model is adopted to control for the possible endogeneity. We use the fitted value of FVAR
after controlling for the self-selection effect as the proxy for GVC participation. Moreover, we
adopt the one-year lagged upstreamness as the instrument for GVC position to eliminate the
reverse causality between upstreamness and wage premium. The empirical results remained
robust after controlling for the endogeneity.
This paper is closely related to other studies on vertical specialization and value-added
trade9.To address firm heterogeneity in GVCs, recent studies merged the enterprise survey data
with customs data to estimate firms’ value-added content embodied in trade, which provided
complementary estimation of DVAR and FVAR compared to the I-O table-based approach
[Dean et al. (2011), Upward et al. (2013), Ahmad et al. (2013), Kee and Tang (2016)]. This
paper combined the procedures of Kee and Tang (2016) and Upward et al. (2013) to estimate
the share of foreign value-added content in exports (FVAR) as the proxy of GVC participa-
tion index [Koopman et al. (2014)]. In addition, this paper also relates to the studies on GVC
length and organization [Fally (2012), Antràs et al. (2012), Wang et al. (2017), Johnson (2017)].
Following Antràs et al. (2012) and Ju and Yu (2015), we calculate the weighted average up-
streamness of export varieties at the firm level as the proxy for firms’ GVC positions.
This paper is related but relatively independent of the previous research about globalization
and its impact on wage inequality10. Some recent literature focused on the new characteristics
9Hummels et al. (2001) estimated the share of imported inputs in the production for exports as the proxy
for vertical specialization using the multi-national input and output tables. Several studies developed Hummels
et al. (2001)’s approach to construct the international input-output tables (IIOTs), which revealed the structure of
global supply chains across borders and sectors [Johnson and Noguera (2012b), Koopman et al. (2014), Timmer
et al. (2015)]. Some studies decomposed the IIOTs into value-added terms by sources with extra double-counting
terms, which enables us to trace the value-added trade from source to destination [ Johnson and Noguera (2012a),
Koopman et al. (2014),Wang et al. (2013), Johnson (2014)]. But the studies of value-added estimation based on
input-output tables neglected firm heterogeneity in GVCs, which leads to aggregation bias [Kee and Tang (2016)].
10Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) provided a detailed summary of the relevant literature on globalization and wage
inequality, concluding trade liberalization increases skill wage premium at the country-level, within sectors, and
within firms. But most of the studies use the gross trade data to estimate the labor market outcomes, which may
overestimate the employment effect of trade [Jiang (2015)]. It is the domestic value-added trade that represents
the real demands for domestic labor[Timmer et al. (2014)]. The discrepancy between domestic value-added trade
and gross trade is enlarging with the rise of GVCs [Johnson and Noguera (2012b)].
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of GVCs and studied their effects on the labor market. For example, Mion and Zhu (2013)
highlighted the role of intermediate trade and concluded that offshoring to China in both in-
termediates and final goods increased the share of skilled workers in Belgian manufacturing
firms. Kasahara et al. (2016) suggested that importing intermediates increased the demands for
educated workers at the plant level. Other studies found that offshoring hurts labor perform-
ing routine tasks while benefiting to the workers performing tasks which are complementary
to offshored jobs [Feenstra and Hanson (1996), Criscuolo and Garicano (2010), Goos et al.
(2009)]. Nevertheless, these studies focused on specific aspects of GVCs (intermediate trade,
offshoring, etc.), and none of them gave a full picture of firms’ GVC activities and their link-
ages with wage inequality. This paper captures firms’ intermediate trade, offshoring and other
GVC activities by value-added trade, and explores firms’ wage premiums changes associated
with their GVC activities. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that provides the
theoretical and empirical framework on how participating and upgrading in GVCs affects the
wage inequality among skills within firms.
The rest of paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we develop the model of heterogeneous
firms to address the changes of skill wage premiums via GVC participation or GVC upgrading.
In section 3, we describe the dataset and present the measurement of GVC indicators. We
also derive the empirical model from the theoretical specifications. In section 4, we show the
empirical results with robustness tests. In section 5, we conclude and provide some policy
implications.
2 Theoretical Framework
In the section, we construct a model of wage inequality, intermediate trade and GVC up-
streamness under the framework of heterogeneous firms of trade following Amiti and Davis
(2011) and Chen et al. (2017). In this model, there are n countries with identical factor endow-
ment. Each country has M firms, which are ex-ante homogeneous but face two uncertainties in
their production. One is their production cost determined by the productivity and labor costs.
Another is the globalization modes of firms. Firms have to overcome the sunk cost to enter the
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domestic and international markets. Each firm produces one variety, which is ex-ante given and
unaffected by firms’ productivity and globalization mode. The setup of the model is as follows:
2.1 Demand
A representative consumer consumes a continuum variety of final goods ω with the CES











where p(ω) is the price of the variety ω . x(ω) is the demand for variety ω . σ is the elasticity
of substitution between final goods with σ > 1. The consumer has a CES preference over the
continuum varieties, thus the demand for the variety ω equals to x(ω) = [ p(ω)P ]
−σ Q (Q ≡U).
Similarly, the revenue from selling final product ω is r(ω) = p(ω)x(ω) = [ p(ω)P ]
1−σ R, where
R is the total revenue of the country satisfying PQ = R and P is the aggregate price index in the






We assume that each firm produces one variety of final goods ω . The value of variety ω ori-
gins from two sources: the domestic value-added content (D(ω)) and the foreign value-added
content (F(ω)). The domestic value-added content (D(ω)) is produced by the domestic inputs,
while the foreign value-added content (F(ω)) is embodied in the imported intermediates. The
production of final goods ω follows a Cobb-Douglas function as follows:
x(ω) = ϕD(ω)αF(ω)1−α (2)
where ϕ is the firm-specific productivity following the distribution of a probability density
function as g(ϕ). α is the share of domestic value-added content in output with α ∈ (0,1). The
domestic value added D(ω) is further assumed to be produced with domestic skills following
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where S(ω) and U(ω) are the skilled and unskilled labor inputs in producing the domestic
value-added content Dω . ρ is the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor
(ρ > 1). Φu and Φs are productivity parameters of unskilled labor and skilled labor respec-
tively, which are affected by variety ω’s upstreamness in GVCs. We assume there is a larger
productivity difference between skilled and unskilled labor in the upstream sectors of GVCs
than that in the downstream industries. If we denote the sector-level upstreamness as z, Φs
Φu
is
an increasing function of the firm’s upstreamness z. Increasing z motivates firms to improve
the productivity of skilled workers relative to unskilled labor. For simplicity, we assume the
exporting variety is ex-ante given; thus, the sector-level upstreamness is exogenous and barely
affected by firms’ performance and wage premium.
ωs and ωu are denoted as the unit wage of skilled and unskilled labor. Under the constraint
















Equation (4) suggests that the wage premium of skilled and unskilled labor is determined by
the input ratio of skilled and unskilled workers and firms’ upstreamness. Increasing the inputs
of specific skill would reduce the relative wage of this skill over the other. Moving to upstream
sectors improve firms’ productivity of skilled labor, which further enlarges the wage inequality
between skilled and unskilled workers.
The marginal cost of domestic value-added content is thus written as follows:



















Equation (5) describes the determinants of domestic value-added content. For simplicity, we
assume productivity parameter of unskilled labor is fixed. The marginal cost of domestic value
added is determined by the skill wage premium (Wω ), the upstreamness of the firm (z), and the
unskilled wage (ωu). Improving the wage premium of skills increases the marginal cost of pro-
ducing domestic value-added content. Upstream firms have a smaller marginal cost of domestic
value-added content than the downstream firms. The marginal cost of domestic value added cωd
is an increasing function of wage inequality whereas a decreasing function of upstreamness.
Firms also use the imported intermediates for production. Let i represents the domestic
market, firms import intermediates from the other n− 1 countries. The foreign value-added













where β j measures the preference of consumers for intermediates from country j. γ is the
elasticity of substitution among intermediates from all the countries (γ > 1). f ωi j is the value
of intermediates imported from country j. Country i has to bear the iceberg cost of importing
intermediates from country j as τmi j > 1. Let p
ω
i j = p j ∗τmi j equal to the importing price of firm ω
from country j. We assume that the price of domestic intermediates equals to 1 for simplicity,
and the import price satisfies p jτmi j ≤ 1 11. The price of foreign intermediate composite equals
to P f = [∑ j(β j p jτmi j )
1−γ ]
1
1−γ satisfying P f ≤ 1 under the constraint of γ > 1 and p jτmi j ≤ 1.











11Only when the imported intermediates have lower costs than domestic inputs, the firm chooses to import
intermediates.
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the revenue of producing variety ω could be written as:






Following Amiti and Davis (2011), we define Γmω = [P1−αf ]




as the ”import globalization” factor, which contains the factors affecting import price. As
γ > 1,σ > 1 and β j p jτmi j < 1, we have Γmω > 1. Using imported intermediates improves firms’
revenue. Similar to import, we assume that firms need to pay sunk cost fx and the iceberg cost
τxω for exports. The revenue of firms that export to n identical countries could be written as
(1+nτ1−σxω )r(ω), where nτ
1−σ
xω represents the aggregated iceberg costs of exporting to n foreign
markets . We denote Γxω = (1+ nτ1−δxω ) as the ”export globalization factor” with Γxω > 1,
indicating exporters tend to have higher revenues than domestic firms. We further define GVC
firms as exporters which use the imported intermediates for the production of exports, while
defining the other firms as non-GVC firms. The profits of firms depend not only on their
marginal costs but also on their globalization modes, which could be written as follows:
π(ω) =




























]1−σ − fe−n( fm + fx) exporters using imported intermediates (13)
where fe is the fixed cost of entering domestic markets while fm and fx are the sunk costs
of importing and exporting respectively. As shown in Equation (13), despite the extra fixed
costs of importing or exporting, the GVC firms could gain extra revenue either by importing
intermediates with low costs (Γmω > 1) or by exporting to multiple foreign markets (Γxω > 1)
12. Moreover, given the variety’s upstreamness in GVCs, firms’ profits increase with the growth
12Following Amiti and Davis (2011), we assume fx >
fe
n Γxω and fm > (
fe
n Γmω).The first condition ensures
the zero-profit firms would not export. The second condition makes sure that zero-profit firms would not import
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of productivity while lessening with the wage premium. Ceteris Paribus, in autarky economy,
the negative relationship between wage premium and firm’s profit is depicted by the declining
curve in Figure (1).
2.3 Fair Wage Hypothesis and Skill Wage Inequality
There are two sources of heterogeneity in the model: productivity and the relative inputs of
skills. Productivity follows a specific distribution with the density function of g(ϕ) [Melitz
(2003)]. To tie the firm’s wage premium with the firm’s performance, we follow Amiti and
Davis (2011) to introduce the fair wage constraint into the model. The fair-wage constraint
is based on the premise that workers have the motivation to adjust their efforts according to
their fairness preference. The fairness depends on the difference between the real wage that
workers receive and the reference wage that they expect to get as fair for their efforts [Akerlof
(1982), Egger et al. (2013)]. Workers who fail to get the reference wage tend to reduce their
efforts to ensure fairness. For firms with better performance, workers would expect a higher
reference wage according to the firm’s profit and their efforts [Akerlof and Yellen (1990)].
The more profitable firms tend to set up a higher fair wage to elicit the efforts of workers
[Danthine and Kurmann (2004)]. Following Amiti and Davis (2011), we assume that there is
no cost to employ workers and the fair wage of zero-profit firms is the numeraire. We further
assume that different skills have different bargaining power in their fair wage 13. Following
Chen et al. (2017), we suppose the skilled workers would adjust their efforts according to their
firms’ performance. Thus, the skilled wage is an increasing function of firms’ profits. However,
the unskilled workers barely have bargaining power in their wages, and thus unskilled wage is
unrelated to firms’ performance. As a result, the firm-level wage premium of skills is positively
correlated with firms’ profits, as shown by the rising curve in Figure (1).
intermediates.
13The assumption that skilled labor has a larger bargaining power on wages than unskilled workers follows
Chen et al. (2017). The assumption is consistent with the predictions of the bargaining model by Helpman et al.
(2010) where firms with higher value-added have more surplus to share among specific skill groups. Chen et al.
(2017) also discussed the possibility that the skilled and unskilled labor have the same bargaining power in wages
but it is skilled workers who gain more additional surpluses. In this paper, we assume that only skilled workers
have the bargaining power in wages to simplify the model, but the predictions with the equal bargaining power of
both skills should keep robust.
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Note: Without loss of generality, the macro variables (i.e., R and P) are assumed to be exogenous.
The sector-level upstreamness z is en-ante given. Firms’ productivity follow a given distribution with
intensity g(ϕ). All else given, we get a unique equilibrium between the firm’s profit and it wage
premium.
Figure 1: Firms’ Wage Inequality and Profits Determination in the Autarky Economy
Figure (1) depicts the determination of firms’ wage inequality and their profits in autarky.
As shown in Equation (10), profits of firms decrease with the marginal cost of domestic value-
added content, which further positively correlates to wage premium. Thus increasing skill
wage premium would reduce domestic profits of firms. According to the fair wage hypothesis,
profitable firms tend to commit higher fair wage to skilled workers to elicit their efforts, which
enlarges the wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers. All else equal, there would
be a unique equilibrium between firms’ profits and the wage premium of skills under the con-
straint of fair wage hypothesis [Amiti and Davis (2011)]. As shown in equation (11)-(13), after
opening up to trade, firms choose their globalization modes by which the GVC firms tend to
have higher profits than non-GVC firms. In the following section, we analyze firms’ decision
in participating GVCs and its impacts on the wage inequality of skills.
2.4 Firms’ Decisions to Participate in GVCs
For potential market entrants, their expected profit from the market is written as V (cω) =
max{0,∑∞0 (1− δ )tπ(cω)} = max{0, 1δ π(cω)} where δ is the exogenous probability of firms’
13
exit [Melitz (2003)]. Only firms with positive expected profits (V (cω) ≥ 0) choose to enter
the market. The profit of the marginal firm ω∗ satisfies π(c∗ω) = 0 with cut-off productivity
ϕ∗. Inspired by Amiti and Davis (2011), we assume that each firm has to pay the fixed cost
fe to produce the final product ω . The production follows a random draw λω = (ϕ,zω ,τ)
which depends on productivity, the upstreamness of the variety, and the marginal trade cost of
imported intermediates. The joint probability density function of λω is g(λω), and its marginal





g(λ )dτdz. The probability of





if ϕ > ϕ∗ (14)
0 otherwise (15)
where G(ϕ) is the cumulative distribution function of gΦ(ϕ) and ϕ∗ is the cut-off productivity
of the marginal firm that enters the domestic market successfully. For successful entrants of







denotes the wage premium within firms. And the average profit of the domestic market would






σ−1v(ϕ)dϕ− fe . The free entry condition (FE) ensures
the expected value of firms equals to zero where the expected revenue equals to the sunk cost
fe with
∫





Equation (16) reveals the relationship between the average market profit and the cut-off produc-
tivity. Higher cut-off productivity indicates a lower cut-off marginal cost c∗ω with the smaller
possibility for firms to enter the market. In this case, firms would expect to get higher profits
to overcome the fixed costs. As a result, the average market profit decreases with the cut-off
marginal cost c∗ω .




r(c∗ω)− fe = 0. c∗ω represents the cut-off marginal cost. The average market profit
14




]1−σ −1} fe (17)
Equation (17) indicates that the average profit depends on the cut-off marginal cost c∗ω , which
is further determined by cut-off productivity ϕ and wage premium W ∗ω . Lower cut-off cost c
∗
ω
expels the inefficient firms out of the market and decreases the average profit of the market due
to the tougher competition. The zero-profit condition (ZCP) suggests the positive correlation
between the average industrial profit and marginal cost c∗ω .
Given the macro variables as exogenous, the marginal cost c∗ω would be uniquely determined
by the free-entry and zero-profit conditions as shown in Figure (2).Only those firms with the
marginal cost cω < c∗ω could enter the domestic market successfully. For the marginal firms
with the cut-off productivity, their profits in the market equal to zero. The wage premium of the



















exogenous. Higher cut-off productivity leads to a larger wage inequality between skilled and
unskilled workers in the marginal firms. Moreover, given a higher z, the wage premium of
firms would be improved by increasing the productivity shifter of skilled labor.
Similar to Melitz (2003), firms choose to import or export after opening up, which lowers
the cut-off marginal cost of domestic firms and forces inefficient firms to exit the market. For
example, for importers, the marginal firms of imports have the zero profit and marginal cost cmω∗
to enter the foreign market. These firms have to bear extra sunk cost of importing ( fm), and their






− fm− fe = 0. Thereby the marginal cost of importing
could be written as cm∗ω =
1
τmi j
( fefm+ fe )
1
σ−1 c∗ω where c
∗
ω is the marginal cost in autarky economy.
As we know τmi j > 1 and σ > 1, the cut-off cost for importing firms(c
m∗
ω ) is smaller than the that
of domestic firms(c∗ω ), which rules the high-cost domestic firms out of the importing market.
Moreover, the probability of entering the foreign market is written as probm =
1−GΦ(ϕ∗m)
1−GΦ(ϕ∗)
where ϕ∗m is the cut-off productivity for marginal importing firms. For importing firms, their






σ−1 . And their aver-
age profit of importing intermediates from one country becomes π̄m j(c̃m) = fm[( c̃mcm∗w )
1−σ −1].
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Figure 2: Industrial Equilibrium in Autarky and Trade
If firms import from N countries at the same time, the average profits from importing would
equal to π̄m(c̃m) = ∑Nj probm · fm[(
c̃m
cm∗w
)1−σ −1]. And their average profit from domestic market












Equation (18) indicates the average profit for firms using imported intermediates are higher
than that of the closed economy. Firms could lower their average cost and gain extra profits
by importing intermediate inputs. According to Melitz (2003), the same pattern exists for
firms of exporting. As shown in Figure (2), there is a unique equilibrium with the free-entry
and zero-profit conditions in autarky, which determines the cut-off marginal costs of entering
the market and the average industrial profit. Trade liberalization moves the zero-profit curve
upwards while keeping the free-entry condition unchanged, which lowers the marginal cost of
entering the market. The high-cost firms are ruled out of the market, which further improves
the average profit of the industry.
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Figure 3: Domestic Firms’ Wage Premium Changes in Open Economy




in autarky to πTd (ω) = fe[(
cω
cT∗ω
)1−σ −1] in open economy as cT∗ω < c∗ω . The fierce competition
after opening up reduces domestic firms’ profit from πd(ω) to πTd (ω) in Figure (3). According
to the fair wage hypothesis, firms with low profits would cut the skilled workers’ fair wage
to reduce their costs. The change narrows the wage inequality between skilled and unskilled
workers within the firms. The same trend exists in the marginal importers or exports, which
enter the foreign markets with zero profits. The profits from foreign markets could not make up
the loss in the domestic market, and as a result, the marginal importers or exporters would like
to reduce their wage premium to maintain the profits in the open economy as shown in Figure
(3).
Firms would choose to import intermediates for the production of exports if their marginal








where cT∗ω is the cut-off marginal cost of trade. c
∗
ω is the cut-off marginal cost in autarky. Γmω is
the import globalization factor and Γmω > 1. Γmω is determined by the CIF price of imported
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Figure 4: The Wage Premium Changes by Importing Intermediates and GVC Upgrading
intermediates (pi jτmi j ) and the number of importing countries (N, j ∈ N). Γxω is the export
globalization factor with Γxω > 1. The GVC firms gain extra profits by importing intermediates
and export to foreign markets, which is shown in Figure (4). Under the fair wage constraint,
the rising profits enable GVC firms to pay higher wages to the skilled workers, which increases
the skill wage premium from equilibrium point E to ET .
Moreover, as shown in equation (13), the profits of GVC firms are negatively correlated to the
marginal cost of domestic value added (cd) where cd = Φ
1
1−ρ






the macro-variables R and P, the unskilled productivity parameter (Φu) and the sector-level
upstreamness z as exogenous, the GVC firms have a unique equilibrium at ET after opening
up, where they have higher profits as well as skill wage premiums than those in autarky. Sup-
pose moving to the upstream sectors generates no extra fixed cost, a larger upstreamness index
z′ would lead to an increase in the productivity shifter Φs(z) and reduce the marginal cost of
domestic value-added cd . The lower marginal cost of domestic value-added increases GVC
firms’ equilibrium profit from πTm(W,τ,z) to π
T
m(W,τ,z
′), suggesting upgrading in GVCs re-
quires firms to be more profitable. The higher upstreamness z′ also improves the productivity
of skilled labor, which widens the equilibrium wage premium from wswu
T to wswu
T ′ in Figure (4).
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According to the Cobb-Douglas production function,the share of domestic value-added in
total inputs equals to α (DVAR), which is assumed to be exogenous with α ∈ (0,1). Thus the
share of foreign value-added content in output is 1−α . The partial derivative for the log profit
of GVC firms over α equals to ∂ lnπ
∂α
=−1−σ1−γ lnP
f +(1−σ)[−lnα− ln(1−α + lncd)]< 0. As
a result, firms with higher shares of foreign value-added content (smaller α) tend to have larger
profits and wage inequality. This result is consistent with the intuition that using more im-
ported intermediate inputs reduces the marginal costs of exporters and increases the profitabil-
ity of firms. The wage of skilled workers is positively correlated to firm performance, therefore
increasing FVAR increases the profits of firms, which in turn raises firms’ wage premium be-
tween skilled and unskilled labor. The predictions of wage premium changes in reaction to the
GVC participation, GVC upgrading, and rising FVAR are summarized as follows:
Proposition Compared to the domestic and non-GVC firms, the GVC firms are more prof-
itable and associated with larger wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers. All
else equal, firms with a higher share of foreign value added in the production tend to have
larger wage inequality of skills. Moreover, moving to upstream sectors in the global value
chains enlarges firms’ wage inequality.
3 Data and Measures
In this section, three critical indicators are measured at the firm level: the share of foreign
value-added content in exports, the upstreamness, and the wage inequality of skills. We extend
the procedures of Kee and Tang (2016) and Upward et al. (2013) to measure the share of foreign
value-added in exports (FVAR) using Chinese manufacturing firm-level data. We follow Antràs
et al. (2012) to measure the upstreamness of exporting varieties and calculate firms’ position
in GVCs by aggregating the upstreamness of exporting varieties to the firm level. Finally, we
adopt Chen et al. (2017)’s approach to develop a Mincer-type econometric model that estimates
the firm-level wage premium with the average wage and skill share.
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3.1 Data description
We use two micro-datasets of China to construct the firm-level GVC indicators: (a) the Chi-
nese manufacturing enterprise survey data from China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS),
(b) the Chinese transaction-level trade data from China’s General Administration of Customs
(GAC). The NBS dataset is an annual survey covering two types of manufacturing firms:
the state-owned (SOE) enterprises and the non-SOEs with annual sales over RMB 5 million
(around the US $770,000). The NBS enterprises in the sample account for almost 95% of
China’s manufacturing outputs. The NBS dataset provides detailed information about firms
with more than 130 financial indicators. The data in our study covers from 2000 to 2006,
during which China entered the WTO and rapidly integrated into the global economy.
As a survey dataset, the NBS data inevitably contains some statistical discrepancies such as
abnormal values, missing variables and misreporting. Despite the high consistency, the NBS
database fails to identify firms across years without the uniform identification code. Thus, we
first encoded enterprises by their name and address to form a unique identification code for
each firm across time [Brandt et al. (2014)]. Following Cai and Liu (2009), we eliminated
the misreporting information. First, we omitted the duplicates and abnormal values from the
sample and then removed the observations with missing critical values, e.g., profits, inputs,
employment, fixed assets, etc. Second, we deleted the small-scale firms with less than eight
employees to rule out the extreme values. Third, we removed companies that break the ”Gen-
erally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)?14. Around 1,560,004 observations of 79,810
firms were omitted from the NBS database after data filter, accounting for 5.1% of the sample.
Another limitation of the NBS data is the lack of detailed information about skills within
firms, except for the year 2004. In the NBS dataset, firms’ employment and average wage
are available annually, but the detailed information of skills, categorized by education and
occupation, is only available for the 2004 survey data. Inspired by Chen et al. (2017), we
construct the firm-level employment of skills by assuming skills have the identical growth rate
14For example, total asset exceeds cash or capital; net value of fixed assets is smaller than the total asset; capital
is less than 0 or exports are higher than the sales.
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in the same province. We get the province-level growth rate of skills from the China Statistical
Yearbook 15. Meanwhile, the 2004 NBS data enabled the calculation of the real employment of
skilled and unskilled workers within firms by education16. Under the assumption of identical
skill growth rate within provinces, we derived the firm-level employment of skills using the
2004 firm-level skill employment data and the province-level skill growth rate in the other
years. This approach makes up the data limitation with consideration of firm heterogeneity. We
further measure the wage of unskilled workers using the provincial data. The unskilled workers
are assumed to have no bargaining power in their salaries. Thus, the unskilled workers accept
the minimum wage, which is assumed to be the 25 percentiles of the province-level average
salary17. The average wage of provinces is collected from the Chinese Trade Unions Statistics
Yearbook.
To calculate the share of imported intermediates exports, we match the NBS dataset with
the Chinese Customs dataset. China’s GAC dataset provides detail trade information at the
transaction level. In each transaction, three types of information are covered: (a) trading firm’s
characteristics such as name, address, postcode and telephone number; (b) the shipment in-
formation such as trade volume, quantity, destinations or origins; and (c) the trading regime
information such as ordinary trade, processing trade, and the others. We matched the NBS
database with the GAC data following the procedures of Feenstra et al. (2014)18. We consider
firms with the same name, telephone number (the last seven digits) and postcode across time
as the same firm. The matched firms account for around 20% of the NBS samples and 35% of
firms in the GAC databases. We summarize the matched data in Table (1).
15The China Statistical Yearbook provides the employment data by province and education. There are seven
categories of education including illiteracy, primary education level, secondary school education level, high school
education level, college, undergraduate, postgraduate and over. We categorize the employees with the college
degree and above as the skilled workers while considering the others as the unskilled workers.
16We also provide an alternative categorization of skills by occupation in the section of robustness checks, and
the results keep unchanged.
17The minimum wage regulations of China started since 2004, which partly overlaps with our sample period.
We follow Chen et al. (2017) to use the 25 percentile of the provincial average wage as the proxy for the unskilled
wage. We also provide an alternative measurement in the section of robustness checks by using the rural wage as
the alternative proxy for the unskilled wage.
18The NBS and GAC databases both have identification code of firms, but they belong to different systems and
unable to match directly.
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Table 1: Matched Data Description
Year Observations Firms ratio in NBS ratio in GAC
2000 1,168,745 21,584 15.02% 26.90%
2001 1,302,202 31,248 19.75% 35.75%
2002 1,473,416 34,041 19.91% 35.03%
2003 1,682,256 37,436 19.87% 33.09%
2004 2,257,771 56,650 21.47% 42.00%
2005 2,204,878 53,804 20.45% 38.44%
2006 2,370,679 82,479 28.24% 41.76%
Note: The table reports the matched result of NBS and GAC databases.
The ratio refers to the number of matched firms over the total number
of firms in the two databases.
Firms participate in the GVCs by using imported intermediate inputs for the production of
exports. According to trade regimes, GVC firms are further categorized into three types: (a)
the ordinary exporters, (b) the processing exporters and (c) the mixed exporters performing
processing trade and ordinary trade at the same time19. China exempts the tariff of imported
intermediates for processing exports to boost export growth. The tariff-free policies require
processing exporters to use all imported intermediate inputs for the production of exports. The
ordinary exporters do not receive the tariff exemption on imported intermediates; thus, they
could use the imported intermediate inputs for domestic production and sales. The categoriza-
tion of Chinese exporters by trade regimes is summarized in Table (2). We observe around
60% of China’s exporters engage in processing trade in the sample period. It suggests that the
estimation of FVAR using international input-output tables (IIOTs) could be biased without
considering the heterogeneity of processing firms in using foreign intermediates [Kee and Tang
(2016)].
We use the World Input and Output tables (WIOD) to measure the upstreamness of exporting
varieties. The WIOD dataset traces the input and output linkages of production across 43
countries and 35 sectors from 2000 to 2014. We follow Antràs et al. (2012)’s procedures to
measure the upstreamness of varieties using the WIOD dataset. The upstreamness of each
19In processing trade, firms import the raw materials and intermediates for processing, and export the finished
products, in the form of final goods or intermediates, to the other countries. Processing exports are massive in
China, accounting for more than 45% of the total exports in 2010 [Feenstra et al. (2014)]. Processing exporters
use more imported intermediates in production than ordinary exporters[Koopman et al. (2012).]
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Table 2: Exporting Firms by Trade Regimes
Year Ordinary exporters Processing exporters Mixed Exporters Total Share of NBS Share of GAC
2000 6,105 2,991 7,542 16,638 11.58% 20.74%
2001 10,455 3,419 9,123 22,997 14.54% 26.31%
2002 12,729 3,172 10,170 26,071 15.25% 26.83%
2003 15,919 3,188 11,138 30,245 16.05% 26.73%
2004 25,208 4,787 15,140 45,135 17.11% 33.46%
2005 26,738 4,855 15,253 46,846 17.81% 22.46%
2006 32,645 5,334 15,754 53,733 18.40% 27.21%
Note: We define firms that use imported intermediates for exports as GVC firms. According to trade regimes, the GVC firms could be
categorized into firms in ordinary trade, firms in processing trade and firms in both ordinary and processing trade (Mixed exporters).
variety is estimated by its weighted average ”distance” to the final demand. The matched
dataset of NBS and GAC enables us to identify the exporting varieties of each firm and calculate
the firm-level average upstreamness weighted by the export share of each variety in the total
exports of the firm[Ju and Yu (2015)].
3.2 GVC measurement
3.2.1 Firm-level GVC participation
In this paper, we define the backward GVC participation index of firms as the share of for-
eign value-added content in exports (FVAR) [Koopman et al. (2014)]. FVAR comes from two
sources of firms: (a) the imported intermediates, (b) the foreign value-added embodied in the
domestic materials [Kee and Tang (2016)]. Chinese processing exporters have to use all their
imported intermediates for the production of exports. However, the ordinary exporters could
use part of imported intermediates for domestic sales 20. We estimate the share of foreign value








where Import pi is the imported intermediates of the processing exporter i. σ
F
i denotes the
foreign value-added content embodied in domestic materials that are used for exporting pro-
20The excessive importers and exporters are ruled out from the sample following Kee and Tang (2016). The
excessive importers are the firms which import more intermediates than they need and sell the imported interme-
diates to the other firms, leading to an overestimation of FVAR. The excessive exporters are the firms that import
intermediates from other domestic firms rather than foreign countries, and thus underestimates the FVAR.
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duction 21. In this paper, we use Kee and Tang (2016)’s estimation of σFi to calculate the share





The measurement of FVAR for non-processing exporters is more complicated than that of
processing exporters. Apart from importing intermediates, the non-processing exporters also
import capital and final products for consumption22. We use the United Nations Broad Eco-
nomic Categories (BEC) to distinguish the imported intermediates from capital and equipment
imports and estimate total value of imported intermediates. Let Importo inti denote the total
value of imported intermediates of firm i, where ”o” refers to ordinary exporters while ”int”
stands for the imported intermediate. The imported intermediates of ordinary exporters are
used for either exports or domestic sales. However, it is challenging to calculate the ratio of
imported intermediate inputs in exports over the total imported intermediates. We further as-
sume the share of imported intermediate inputs in exports is proportional to the share of exports
in total sales, which ensures the same ratio of imported intermediate inputs in both domestic
sales and exports. Under the proportion assumption, the FVAR of ordinary exporters and mixed




















The mixed exporters conduct processing exports and ordinary exports at the same time. As
shown in Equation (22), the superscripts p and o denote processing trade and ordinary trade.
”int” refers to the import of intermediates. ”dom sales” represents the domestic sales of firms.
21From the GVC perspective, the imported intermediates also contain domestic value added σDi , which should
be subtracted from the value of imported intermediates. Koopman et al. (2014) estimated the share of domestic
value added in imported intermediates (σDi ) and found σ
D
i only accounts for 0.7% of the ordinary exports and
almost 0% of the processing exports. Kee and Tang (2016) neglected σDi in calculating the share of domestic
value added in Chinese processing exports. We follow Kee and Tang (2016) to assume that σDi = 0 for processing
exporters.
22The imported capital and equipment of processing firms are listed separately in the category of ”Equipment
for Processing Trade” in GAC database. Thus Import pi only measures the value of imported intermediates of
processing exporters. But we have to distinguish the imported intermediates from imported capital and equipment
in the ordinary trade.
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Exporti is the gross exports of mixed exporters, while exportoi stands for the part of ordinary
exports. Mixed exporters have to use all the imported intermediates of processing trade in
exports. Thus the foreign value-added share of the processing export is shown in the first item
of Equation (22). The share of imported intermediates by ordinary imports in exports is shown
in the second item of Equation (22). The share of foreign value added embodied in the domestic
materials for exports lies in the third item.
We further calculate the aggregated industry- and country-level FVAR index with the firm-
level FVAR data 23 [Kee and Tang (2016)]:










∑ j ∑i∈Ω j EXPi
FVARi (24)
The aggregated country- and sectoral level FVAR are the weighted average of firm-level
FVAR with firms? exporting share as weights [Kee and Tang (2016)]. We estimate China’s
aggregated FVAR index by trade regimes during 2000-2006 as given in Figure (5). We observe
a higher FVAR in processing exports than in ordinary exports, which is consistent with the find-
ings of Koopman et al. (2012) and Kee and Tang (2016). We also find that the average FVAR
of Chinese manufacturing firms decreased from 0.42 in 2000 to 0.30 in 2006 respectively. The
declining FVAR is primarily due to the processing exporters, whose FVAR dropped from 0.51
to 0.45 in the sample period. The FVAR of ordinary exports also reduced from 0.16 in 2000 to
0.13 in 2006.
We also calculate the weighted average FVAR by different types of firms in Figure (6). The
processing exporters used the highest share of foreign value-added with around 50% FVAR in
processing exports. The ordinary exporters only use about 10% of foreign content in exports.
23The approach applies to firms in one sector with direct trading. For firms in multiple industries, extra con-
straints should be applied to rule out excessive processing importers[Kee and Tang (2016)].
25
Figure 5: Country-level FVAR in Chinese Exports
Figure 6: Average FVAR by the types of firms, 2000-2006
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The mixed exporters use almost 40% of foreign value added in exports. The processing ex-
porters reduced their FVAR from 0.57 in 2000 to 0.39 in 2006, while the ordinary exporters’
FVAR was declining from 0.12 to 0.07 between 2000 and 2006. The mixed firms also had a
descending trend of FVAR from 0.43 to 0.37 during the sample period. The results indicate
that all the manufacturing firms in China tend to use less imported intermediates for exports
and participate less in the backward production linkages of GVCs.
Figure 7: FVAR trend by industry during 2000-2006
We further plot the FVAR trend by different manufacturing industries in Figure (7). Except
for the industry of base metal, all the manufacturing sectors in China had a declining trend
of FVAR during the sample period. We find that the industries with prominent processing
trade, such as textile, machinery and non-metallic processing, experienced the most significant
declines in FVAR by 21%, 17%, and 15% respectively during 2000-2006. It suggests that
the Chinese manufacturing exporters tended to substitute domestic materials for the imported
intermediates. It may because the domestic materials in China are available at lower prices and
with more varieties in the process of trade liberalization[Kee and Tang (2016)].
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3.2.2 Firm-level GVC position
Mapping firm’s position in GVCs is crucial to study firms’ GVC activities and their impacts
on the labor market. Antràs et al. (2012) proposed the methodology to measure the position of
sectors in GVCs, which was named as the ”upstreamness” of industries in GVCs. The sector-
level upstreamness is the weighted average distance from this industry to the final demands
through GVCs. The distance is measured by the number of steps from the industry to the final
goods in the international input-output tables. As we know, the manufacturing firms export
several varieties at the same time and we derive the upstreamness of each exporting variety in
GVCs in our sample.
For any variety j, its output (Y j) could be either used as intermediates of other sectors (I j) or
consumed as final goods directly (Fj). As we know, Yj = I j +Fj. Assume there are N industries
in GVCs, the total output of j is written as Yj = ∑Nk=1 d jkYk +Fj, where d jk refers to the amount
of j’s output as intermediates to produce 1 unit of industry k’s final goods. In the international
input-output tables, the variety j’s output could be iterated with infinite terms as follows:
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Equation (25) shows the outputs of industry j could be absorbed either directly or indirectly
in the final demand. The second right term of Equation (25) indicates that the output of industry
j is directly used in the production of final goods k, by which the distance between industry j
and the final demand is one step. The third right term of Equation(25) suggests that industry j’s
output is firstly used as intermediates of industry m and then absorbed the final goods k, then the
distance between industry j and final demand is two steps. Similarly, the distance of industry j
to the final demand in the fourth right term is three steps, suggesting industry j’s output comes
into the final use through two industries. We can get the distance of all the intermediates from
industry j to the final goods k and measure its average distance to the final goods using its input
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coefficients as weights in Equation (26):























where U j denotes the upstreamness of industry j relative to the final demand in the interna-
tional input-output tables. d jk stands for the ( j,k)th element in the N×N input matrix of the
international input-output tables. It represents how many output of variety j should be used to
produce 1 unit of final goods k. Y j is the total output of variety j.
The larger the distance between variety j and the final demand is, the more upstream position
the variety j lies in GVCs. A firm could export multiple varieties at the same time. Thus we
estimate the firm-level GVC position by taking the weighted average of upstreamness across
industries using the share of each variety’s exports in total exports of the firm as the weight.
The measurement is shown in Equation (27).








where U j is the industry-level upstreamness of variety j. expi j is firm i’s gross exports of
variety j. expi is firm i’s total exports of all the varieties. We identify the exporting varieties
and their exporting values from the GAC dataset.
Figure (8) shows the average upstreamness index of Chinese manufacturing firms by indus-
tries and trade regimes. The upstreamness index varied from 1.9 (leather and footwear) to 4.4
(petroleum) during 2000-2006. The energy and raw material industries (petroleum, base met-
als, pulp, and wood) locate at the upstream of GVCs. The high-tech manufacturing industries,
such as machinery, optical and photographic equipment, vehicles and aircraft, have higher po-
sitions in GVCs than the unskilled-labor intensive sectors such as textile, furniture, leather,
and footwear. All the manufacturing industries in China have a rising trend of upstreamness,
indicating the upgrading of Chinese manufacturing firms to upstream sectors of GVCs. There
is no significant difference between the position of processing exporters and that of ordinary
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Figure 8: Upstreamness Trend by Industry and Trade Regime,2000-2006
exporters for most industries.
3.3 Skill Share and Wage Inequality
In this paper, we categorize firms’ employees into the skilled and unskilled labor by educa-
tion. There are five categories of education in the NBS dataset: postgraduate or above, under-
graduate, college, high school, and secondary school or below. According to the International
Standard Classification of Education (ISCED 2011), employees with a college degree or above
are categorized as skilled labor, while those with high school education or below are classified
as unskilled workers. As discussed in the data part, the details of employment by skills are
only available in 2004. We assume all the firms within province have the same growth rate of
skills. Using the province-level skill growth rate and 2004 firm-level data, we estimate firms’
employment of skills for the other years during 2000-2006.
We denote the measured skill share as θi jlt where i is the firm, j is the industry, l is the
province and t is time. The wage of skilled and unskilled workers of the firm are written as
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wsi jlt and w
u
jlt . As discussed, w
s
i jlt relies on firm i’s profits, but w
u
jlt is assumed to be determined
by the provincial-level minimum wage. Following Chen et al. (2017), the average wage of
















−1 as a monotonic function of wage premium
wsi jlt
wujlt
, the logarithmic of average wage
in firm i is written as follows:
ln ¯wi jlt = lnwujlt + ln(1+θi jltsi jlt)≈ lnw
u
jlt +θi jltsi jlt (28)
The average wage of the firm equals to the aggregated wage of skills weighted by skill share.




wage. When θi jltsi jlt is small enough, ln(1+ θi jltsi jlt) ≈ θi jltsi jlt . We get the approximate
Mincer-type income function at the firm level.
According to the theoretical model, the wage inequality of skills is affected by firms’ char-
acteristics and their GVC activities. For simplicity, we suppose the function of wage premium







i jlt + εi jlt (29)
where xgi jlt is the vector of indicators that affect the skill wage inequality. It includes firms’
participation index (FVAR) and position index (upstreamness) of GVCs and other firm-level
characteristics. Substituting equation (29) into equation (28), we get a Mincer-type empirical
specification as follows:
ln ¯wi jlt = γ0+γulnwujlt +γ1θi jltFVARi jlt +γ2θi jltF U pstreamnessi jlt +γθi jltXi jlt +σi+σ jl+σt +εi jlt
(30)
where εi jlt = εi jltθi jlt . lnwujlt is the unskilled wage at the provincial level. The interactions
between firm-level GVC indicators and skill share (θi jlt) investigate whether firms’ GVC ac-
tivities affect the skill wage inequality via changing skill shares. FVARi jlt measures firms’
backward participation in the global value chains and F U pstreamnessi jlt captures firms’ po-
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sition in the global value chains. As predicted in the theory, using more foreign content in
exports (FVAR) enlarges firms’ wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labor. Thus we
expect γ1 to be positive and statistically significant. We also predict that moving to upstream
sectors widens firms’ wage inequality of skills. Thus γ2 is also expected to be significantly pos-
itive. Xi jlt is a vector of control variables interacted with skill share (θi jlt) including firm size,
age, capital-labor ratio, dummy for state-owned enterprises, foreign ownership and processing
trade. Firm size is measured by the ratio of the firm’s sales over the industrial sales to control
for the within-industry heterogeneity. The model also controls the time-specific, firm-specific
and sector-province specific fixed effects. We describe the main variables in the regression in
Table (3).
Table 3: Variable description
2004 2000-2006
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
log Firm Average wage 45,698 7.814 1.236 245,121 7.900 1.271
log Unskilled Wage 45,735 8.502 0.256 245,381 8.467 0.350
skill share 45,735 0.143 0.176 209,405 0.131 0.168
FVAR 24,561 0.449 0.382 133,547 0.442 0.377
Firm-level Upstreamness 41,177 2.782 0.664 220,742 2.871 0.666
log Firm size 45,735 -5.496 1.282 245,381 -5.310 1.339
Firm age 45,729 7.887 8.467 245,201 8.870 16.887
log TFP by OP 45,117 1.769 0.146 244,393 1.774 0.152
log TFP by LP 45,589 1.886 0.198 244,296 1.907 0.186
log capital labor ratio 45,690 3.662 1.425 244,769 3.721 1.419
SOE dummy 45,735 0.029 0.167 245,381 0.040 0.197
processing firm dummy 45,735 0.105 0.306 245,381 0.113 0.317
foreign ownership dummy 45,735 0.474 0.499 245,381 0.481 0.500
log value added per worker 35,229 -3.476 1.432 244,950 3.873 1.154
log profit per worker 22,217 0.250 0.132 193,348 -3.495 1.414
fitted FVAR by Heckman 21,812 0.256 0.131 152,793 0.254 0.131
Note: The first three columns describe the variables of the 2004 cross-section data where skill share is





In the baseline estimation, we use both 2004 cross-section data and 2000-2006 panel data
to explore the nexus between GVC activities and the wage inequality of skills within firms.
The advantage of 2004 data is the availability of firm-level skill share. Despite the measured
skill share, the panel data between 2000 and 2006 provides a better understanding of the skill
premium variation within firms in response to the GVC activities. The baseline estimation
results are shown in Tables (4) and (5) respectively.
Table (4) reports the estimation of the cross-sectional regression. Column (1) examines the
determinants of firm-level wage inequality with a simple ordinary least square (OLS) regres-
sion. Column (2) regresses the determinants interacted with skill share following the empirical
specification of Equation (28) without controlling for the fixed effects. As predicted, the in-
teraction between FVAR and skill share is significantly positive, suggesting firms with higher
FVAR are associated with larger wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers. The
interaction between upstreamness and skill share, however, is not significant in column (2). We
also observe that the interactions of firms’ size and capital-labor ratio are significantly posi-
tive. It means the large-scale firms and capital-intensive firms tend to use more skilled labor
in the production, which in turn raises the firm’s skill premium. We control for the industry-
, province- and province-sector specific fixed effects in the last three columns. Column (3)
reports the OLS regression of wage determinants with fixed effects. Column (4) reports the
estimation of Mincer-type wage model with controlling for the fixed effects. The coefficient
of FVAR interacted with the skill share is still positive and significant, suggesting increasing
FVAR enlarges the wage inequality of skills at the firm level. The interaction coefficient be-
tween upstreamness and skill share turns to be significant after controlling for the fixed effects.
It means that firms in the upstream sectors tend to have larger skill wage premiums and skill
shares than those in the downstream industries. The estimation results of firms’ size and capital
intensity keep robust in the column (4) after controlling for the fixed effects.
33
Table 4: Baseline Estimation Using 2004 Cross-sectional Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
× Skill share × Skill share ×Skill share×processing
ln unskilled wage 0.300*** 0.310*** 0.843** 0.864** 0.881**
(0.030) (0.030) (0.386) (0.380) (0.380)
Skill share (θi jlt) -0.299*** -1.076*** -0.497*** -1.667*** -1.675***
(0.048) (0.316) (0.059) (0.385) (0.384)
FVAR 0.304*** 0.185*** 0.225*** 0.098*** 0.116***
(0.021) (0.028) (0.022) (0.029) (0.030)
f upstreamness -0.152*** -0.153*** -0.052*** -0.079*** -0.082***
(0.012) (0.016) (0.017) (0.021) (0.021)
lnsize -0.015** -0.041*** 0.013 -0.027** -0.027**
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011)
lnK/L 0.069*** 0.017** 0.089*** 0.028*** 0.029***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
age 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Foreign ownership -0.015 0.043** -0.037** -0.023 -0.026
(0.017) (0.022) (0.018) (0.022) (0.022)
Processing firm -0.267*** -0.247*** -0.406*** -0.379*** -0.380***
(0.022) (0.028) (0.025) (0.030) (0.030)
SOE 0.567*** 0.574*** 0.390*** 0.429*** 0.430***
(0.051) (0.078) (0.063) (0.092) (0.092)
θi jlt*FVAR 0.615*** 0.600*** 0.606***
(0.111) (0.127) (0.127)
θi jlt*upstreamness 0.105 0.197** 0.200**
(0.067) (0.081) (0.081)
θi jlt*lnsize 0.250*** 0.280*** 0.279***
(0.036) (0.044) (0.044)
θi jlt*lnK/L 0.384*** 0.419*** 0.417***
(0.030) (0.036) (0.036)
θi jlt foreign -0.409*** -0.145 -0.142
(0.093) (0.111) (0.111)
θi jlt*processing -0.359* -0.375
(0.212) (0.242)
θi jlt*SOE -0.133 -0.199 -0.206
(0.264) (0.348) (0.348)
θi jlt*FVAR* processing -2.046***
(0.590)
θi jlt* upstreamness*processing 0.345**
(0.151)
Constant 5.241*** 5.234*** -0.411 -0.434 -0.585
(0.260) (0.262) (3.140) (3.090) (3.091)
Province-sector FE NO NO YES YES YES
Observations 24521 24521 24521 24521 24521
r2 0.114 0.126 0.199 0.212 0.213
Note: Standard errors clustered at the firm level are listed in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗p < 0.01. We control the province-,
sector- and province-sector specific fixed effects in the last three columns to eliminate the effects of unobservable variables.
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We also consider the difference between processing exporters and ordinary exporters in
GVCs. As analyzed above, processing exporters decrease more in FVAR than ordinary ex-
porters as they substitute domestic for imported intermediates [Kee and Tang (2016)], which
indirectly substitute domestic skills for foreign workforces. To examine the impact, we include
a triple interaction among FVAR, skill share, and the dummy for processing firms in the column
(5). The coefficient of the triple interaction is significantly negative with the net effect equals
to 0.116+(0.606−2.046)×0.143 =−0.09 < 0 given the average skill share in 2004 as 0.143.
It suggests the declining FVAR in processing firms has raised the wage inequality of skills,
which seems to be contrary to the effect of the overall FVAR on skill premium. One possible
explanation is that the imported intermediates of processing trade tend to be skill-biased in-
puts[Feenstra and Hanson (1996), Ho et al. (2005)]. The substitution of imported intermediate
inputs with domestic materials has shifted the demands for foreign skilled workers embodied
in imported intermediates to the domestic labor market. As a result, the net effect of FVAR on
wage premium is smaller for processing exporters than ordinary firms, which partially offset
the net effect of FVAR on skill premium via changing firms’ profits according to the fair wage
hypothesis. Another possible reason for the coefficient is the existence of unobserved variables
correlated with the GVC participation and processing dummy that may lead to biased estima-
tion of the baseline model. We will correct the endogenous problem in the next section. For the
ordinary firms, the net effect of FVAR on wages equals to 0.116+0.606×0.143 = 0.203 > 0,
which suggests the declining FVAR lower firms’ skill wage premium. We also observe a
positive coefficient of the triple interaction among upstreamness, skill share, and processing
dummy, suggesting the processing firms in the upstream sectors have higher wage premium of
skills than those in the downstream sectors. The result is similar to the ordinary firms with a
significantly positive coefficient of upstreamness interacted with the skill share.
The regression results using the panel data of 2000-2006 are shown in Table (5). The first
two columns demonstrate the estimation of wage determinants without controlling for the fixed
effects. As shown in Column (2), the coefficient of FVAR interacted with the measured skill
share keeps positive and significant, suggesting rising FVAR leads to higher wage premium
within firms. The interaction between skilled-share and upstreamness is insignificant without
35
Table 5: Baseline Estimation Using 2000-2006 Panel Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
× Skill share Skill share ×Skill share×processing
ln unskilled wage 0.878*** 0.870*** -0.014 1.013*** 1.013***
(0.016) (0.019) (0.024) (0.016) (0.016)
skilled share (θi jlt) 0.193*** -1.034*** 0.233*** -1.683*** -1.679***
(0.040) (0.217) (0.089) (0.315) (0.315)
FVAR 0.017* -0.011 -0.015 -0.067*** -0.062***
(0.010) (0.013) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015)
upstreamness 0.026*** 0.018* -0.062*** 0.022 0.022
(0.008) (0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015)
ln size -0.038*** -0.040*** -0.016*** -0.039*** -0.039***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
ln K/L -0.027*** -0.051*** -0.099*** -0.094*** -0.094***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
age 0.004* 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
foreign -0.000 -0.007 0.033*** 0.004 0.004
(0.009) (0.012) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015)
processing -0.111*** -0.089*** -0.065*** -0.056*** -0.060***
(0.009) (0.012) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012)
SOE 0.268*** 0.369*** 0.067*** 0.119*** 0.119***
(0.021) (0.028) (0.018) (0.027) (0.027)
θi jlt*fvar 0.188*** 0.114* 0.121*
(0.058) (0.065) (0.065)
θi jlt*upstreamness 0.050 0.144** 0.143**
(0.051) (0.066) (0.066)
θi jlt*lnsize 0.034 -0.134*** -0.133***
(0.024) (0.028) (0.028)
θi jlt*lnK/L 0.194*** 0.040 0.040
(0.027) (0.036) (0.036)
θi jltage 0.033** 0.001 0.001
(0.014) (0.006) (0.006)
θi jlt*foreign 0.054 0.270*** 0.269***
(0.065) (0.084) (0.084)
θi jlt*processing -0.330*** -0.321***
(0.105) (0.117)






Constant 0.407*** 0.615*** 10.380*** 0.377 1.876***
(0.122) (0.144) (0.271) (0.307) (0.226)
Year FE NO NO YES YES YES
Firm FE NO NO YES YES YES
Province-sector FE NO NO YES YES YES
Observations 114697 114697 114697 114697 114697
R2 0.208 0.204 0.261 0.230 0.230
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗ ∗p < 0.01. All the regressions use the robust estimator of variance.
Column(1) reports the determinants of firms’ wage using OLS without fixed effects.Column(2) add the interactions with skill share.
Column(3) control the firm-, time- and province-sectoral fixed effects. Column (4) reports the results with interactions and fixed effects.
Column (5) examines the net effect of GVC activities on firm wages for processing firms.
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controlling for the fixed effects. Large-scale and capital-intensive firms tend to be more skill-
intensive in their production and have higher wage premium of skills. We control the year-
specific, province-sector specific and firm-specific fixed effects in the last three columns. The
interactive coefficient of FVAR is robust in column (4), suggesting the decline of China’ overall
FVAR narrows firms’ wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labor over the sample pe-
riod. The coefficient of upstreamness interaction is positive and significant, indicating moving
to upstream sectors along GVCs increases the wage premium of skills. Column (5) considers
the heterogeneity of processing firms in the global value chains over the sample period. The
coefficient of triple interaction among FVAR, skill share, and processing firms is significantly
negative. It suggests Chinese processing firms have an overturned effect of FVAR on skill
wage premium as they switch their demand for skilled labor from imported intermediate inputs
to domestic materials. However, the result may be biased due to endogeneity in the model.
There is also no significant difference between processing firms and non-processing firms in
terms of GVC upgrading on wage premium because the triple interaction among upstreamness,
processing dummy and skill share is statistically insignificant.
The baseline results highlight several interesting implications for the impacts GVC activities
on the wage premium at the firm level. Firstly, increasing FVAR induces skill-biased produc-
tion and widens the wage inequality of skills within firms. This result is consistent with the
prediction of the theory. Imported intermediates reduce firms’ marginal costs and thus leads to
higher profits. According to the fair wage hypothesis, more profitable firms tend to pay higher
wages to their skilled workers to elicit their efforts, leading to a higher wage inequality of skills
of these firms. For Chinese manufacturing firms, on average, the declining FVAR reduces firm-
level wage premium and narrows the wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers.
However, this effect is different for processing firms, which decrease their FVAR by replacing
imported intermediate inputs with cheaper domestic inputs and induce new demands for the
skilled workforce. Besides, moving up to upstream sectors along the GVCs raises the wage
premium of skills at the firm level. This result supports the intuition that upgrading positions
in the global value chains encourage firms to employ more skilled workers, which widens the
wage inequality of skills of these firms.
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4.2 Endogeneity
One critical problem of the baseline estimation is endogeneity. Similar to exporting, partici-
pating in GVCs incurs sunk costs, e.g., the fixed costs of equipment, new plant, communication,
and logistics network. The sunk costs make it impossible for every firm to participate in GVCs.
Only firms with higher productivity, larger size, or higher profits are more likely to overcome
the sunk costs and engage in GVCs [Baldwin et al. (2014)]. The self-selection of firms into
the GVCs may lead to an endogeneity problem in estimating the effect of GVC participation
on firm wage. Moreover, the upstreamness of firms in the global value chains may also have
a reciprocal relationship with their wage inequality where skill-intensive firms are more likely
to upgrade in the global value chains. These unobserved factors could be partly absorbed by
the year- and sector-province specific fixed effects. However, if the unobserved variables are
time variant, the estimation of the baseline model would be biased without controlling for the
endogeneity in the estimation.
We first control for the self-selection effect in GVCs. The decision to participate in GVCs
is endogenous to firm within industries due to self-selection effect. Moreover, the extent of
engagement in GVCs(FVAR) is also endogenous due to reciprocal causality if skill-intensive
firms participate more in GVCs. The coefficient of FVARi jlt in the baseline model varies across
firms, and its heterogeneity is correlated with covariates within industries. One way to solve the
endogenous problem is to replace the endogenous variable FVAR with the Heckman corrected
value of FVAR and re-estimate the baseline model with the fitted FVAR 24. The estimation is
implemented by bootstrap to correct standard errors [Wooldridge (2008)].
We use the Heckman two-step selection model to predict the fitted value of FVAR after
controlling for the self-selection effect. The GVC firms use imported intermediates for the
production of exports. Thus, we define the exporters that have no imports or only import
capital and consumption goods as non-GVC firms. The probability of participating in GVCs
24Several studies have used the approach to deal with the endogeneity of self-selection effect such as Feen-
stra et al. (2014) which studied the impacts of credit constraint on exports and Yu (2015) which explored the
endogenous processing trade’s impacts on productivity
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(Ei j,t) is written as:
Prob(Enteri jlt = 1) = Φ(αi +αt + γZi jlt) (31)
where Zi jlt is the vector of exogenous variables affecting the decision of entering the GVCs.
We use the one-period laggedXi jl,t (e.g., size, SOE, foreign ownership, capital/labor ratio and
unskilled wage) as regressors of Zi jlt . ADB (2017) found that older companies are more likely
to join in GVCs as they tend to have better infrastructure and performance to overcome the
sunk costs of GVCs. We choose the lagged one-period of firm’s age as the excluded variable
that affects firms’ entering decision but has no impact on the extent of participation in GVCs.
The estimation results are shown in Table (6). The 1st step of Heckman two-step selection
model shows firms with higher productivity25 are more likely to participate in GVCs. The
capital-intensive firms, state-owned firms, and foreign firms also have a higher possibility of
entering the GVCs. Older firms are more likely to enter the GVCs than the young firms. The
large-scale firms are less likely to participate in GVCs than small companies, but they tend
to have higher FVAR once they entered. The inverse Mills ratio is significant at the signifi-
cance level of 0.05, rejecting the null hypothesis that there is no endogenous problem in the
estimation.
The Heckman two-step selection model predicts the fitted value of FVAR conditional on
the unobserved self-selection effect. The outcome equation of FVAR after controlling for the
self-selection effect is written as follows:
FVARi jlt = E(FVARi jlt |Zi jlt)+ εi jlt , withE(εi jlt |Zi jlt) = 0 (32)
We reestimate the baseline model with the predicted FVAR following the empirical specifi-
cation as below:
ln ¯wi jlt = γ0 + γulnwujlt + γ1θi jltE(FVARi jlt |Zi jlt)+ γ2θi jltF U pstreamnessi jlt
+γXi jlt +σi +σ jl +σt + εi jltθi jlt
(33)
25We use the approach ofOlley and Pakes (1992) to estimate the productivity of firms. We also adopt the
methodology of Petrin and Levinsohn (2012) to measure the alternative productivity in the robustness check
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Table 6: Heckman Two Step Estimation Results
1st Step 2nd Step
Pr(Enter) FVAR
lagged size -0.009** 0.004***
(0.004) (0.001)
lagged K/L 0.090*** 0.030***
(0.003) (0.001)
lagged SOE 0.147*** -0.022***
(0.018) (0.008)
lagged unskilled wage 0.144*** -0.015
(0.054) (0.020)








Inverse Mills Ratio -0.375***
(0.022)
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes
Sector-Province Fixed Effect Yes Yes
Observations 152793 152793
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p< 0.10,∗∗ p< 0.05,∗∗
∗p < 0.01. Column(1) reports the first stage of Heckman two-
step regression.Pr(Enter) refers the possibility of engaging in
GVCs. Column (2) shows the 2nd step of Heckman regres-
sion. Both columns control for the time fixed effects and sector-
province specific fixed effects.
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where E(FVARi jlt |Zi jlt) is the fitted value of FVAR, which absorbs the unobserved self-selection
effects. F U pstreamnessi jlt represents the firms’ position in GVCs. It’s challenging to find a
perfect instrument for the upstreamness. Inspired by Amiti and Davis (2011) and Chen et al.
(2017), we use the one-year lag of upstreamness as the instrument of GVC position. The
lagged upstreamness is less likely to be affected by the current wage, which eliminates the
reverse causality between upstreamness and wage inequality. We report the 2SLS estimation
results with fitted FVAR and instrument for upstreamness in Table (7).
Column (1) of Table (7) reports the coefficients of wage determinants with the FVAR fit-
ted value and the instrument of upstreamness. Column (2) demonstrated the regression results
jwith the interactions of skill share. The coefficient of fitted FVAR interacted with skill share
is significant and positive, which is consistent with the baseline results. The interaction be-
tween upstreamness and skill share also keeps significantly positive, suggesting moving up to
upstream sectors raises firms’ wage premiums with more skilled workforces. The 2SLS esti-
mation results of the other control variables also keep robust to the baseline estimation, which
confirms large-scale and capital-intensive firms have wider wage inequality than the other firms.
We also consider the heterogeneity of processing firms in determining wage premiums in col-
umn (3). The triple interaction among the wage premium, fitted FVAR and processing dummy
turns to be insignificant, suggesting the opposite result of processing dummy in the baseline
model may be due to endogeneity.
We also test the validity of instruments as shown at the bottom of the table (7). The Kleibergen-
Paap rk LM statistic reports the null hypothesis that the excluded instrument is relevant to the
endogenous regressors is rejected at the 1% significance level. The Cragg-Donald Wald F
statistic and Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic also reject the null hypothesis of the weak instru-
ment at the 1% significance level, suggesting the instrument is strong and valid. As the model
is just identified, we do not report the over-identification test in the table.
41
Table 7: 2SLS Estimation with Fitted FVAR, 2000-2006
(1) (2) (3)
× Skill share × Skill share ×processing
ln unskilled wage -0.096* -0.106* -0.106*
(0.058) (0.057) (0.057)
Skill share -0.135*** -1.586*** -1.584***
(0.032) (0.216) (0.216)
E( f var|Pr(enter)) 2.140*** 1.804*** 1.809***
(0.064) (0.072) (0.072)
upstreamness -0.050*** -0.063*** -0.063***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
ln size 0.035*** -0.006 -0.006
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
ln K/L 0.029*** -0.017*** -0.017***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
age 0.013*** 0.005 0.005
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Foreign ownership -0.349*** -0.261*** -0.262***
(0.022) (0.020) (0.020)
Processing firm -0.245*** -0.239*** -0.236***
(0.013) (0.015) (0.015)
SOE 0.650*** 0.702*** 0.702***
(0.055) (0.056) (0.056)
Skill share× E(fvar*—Pr(select)) 1.972*** 1.984***
(0.394) (0.394)
Skill share× upstreamness 0.087** 0.086**
(0.044) (0.044)
Skill share× lnsize 0.304*** 0.304***
(0.022) (0.022)
skill share × lnK/L 0.380*** 0.380***
(0.023) (0.023)
skill share× age 0.096*** 0.096***
(0.010) (0.010)
skill share× foreign -0.571*** -0.569***
(0.107) (0.107)
skill share× processing -0.141
(0.122)
skill share × SOE -0.898*** -0.898***
(0.187) (0.187)
skill share × upstreamness× processing 0.057
(0.091)
skill share× E( f var|Pr(enter))× processing -1.060
(0.805)
Constant 8.253*** 8.492*** 8.486***
(0.539) (0.530) (0.530)
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 2.2e+04*** 1.2e+04***
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 6.0e+05*** 1,9e+05***
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic 2.5e+05*** 2.9e+05***
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Sector-Province Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Observations 125734 125734 125734
R2 0.177 0.197 0.197
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗p < 0.01.42
4.3 Robust Estimates
4.3.1 Mechanism
In this section, we provide more detailed evidence on how GVC participation or GVC up-
grading improves the skill wage premium within firms. As shown in theory, importing inter-
mediate inputs lowers the marginal costs of firms and increases their profits, which enlarges
the wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labor. Upgrading in GVCs requires higher
productivity of the skilled labor. In order to elicit the efforts of skilled workers, the upgrading
firms have to commit a higher wage for the skilled workforces, which increases the wage pre-
mium of skills. The fair wage model has tied firms’ wage premium with their GVC activities
by adjusting profits and productivity. In this section, we examine the mechanism of the model
with fair wage hypothesis empirically.
Inspired by Chen et al. (2017), we use the value-added per worker as a proxy for labor pro-
ductivity and include its interaction with the FVAR and upstreamness in the empirical model.
The labor productivity interactive coefficients are expected to be significantly positive, indicat-
ing rising FVAR or upgrading in GVCs improve firms’ wage premium of skills via increas-
ing productivity. Moreover, we measure the firm’s average profit by calculating the profit per
worker at the firm level. We also interact the average profit with FVAR and upstreamness.
According to the fair wage hypothesis, profitable firms are more likely to pay high wages to
the skilled workers. Thus the coefficients of interactions between GVC indicators and aver-
age profit are also expected to be positive as using more foreign value-added and upgrading
in GVCs increase the skill premium via raising profits. We re-estimate Equation (28) with the
new interactions using the 2004 data and 2000-2006 panel data respectively. The results are
shown in Table (8).
Column (1) reports the OLS regression using the 2004 cross-sectional data with variables
interacted with the labor productivity. The coefficient of interaction between FVAR and labor
productivity is significantly positive, suggesting rising FVAR leads to a higher wage premium
of skills via increasing the labor productivity. Similarly, the coefficient of upstreamness inter-
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acted with log value-added per worker is also significantly positive. It means that upstream
firms are more productive than the downstream firms with larger wage premiums. Column (2)
explores the impact of GVC activities on wage inequality via adjusting firms’ profits. The sig-
nificantly positive coefficient of FVAR interacted with the log of average profit suggests firms
with higher FVAR tend to be more profitable and have larger wage inequality between skilled
and unskilled workers. Moreover, we also observe upstream firms have wider wage inequality
than the downstream firms with higher average profits. Columns (3) and (4) use the panel data
of 2000-2006 to explore the mechanism of GVCs affecting the firm-level skill premium. We
still use the fitted value of FVAR from the Heckman two-step estimation to control for the self-
selection effect and use the one-year lagged upstreamness as the instrument. Again, the 2SLS
estimation results are consistent with the OLS estimates using 2004 data. The coefficients of
FVAR and upstreamness interacted with labor productivity are statistically significant and pos-
itive. Moreover, the interactions between GVC indicators and average profit, in column (4), are
statistically significant and positive. Both results confirm the fact that rising firms’ FVAR or
upstreamness of GVCs boosts their skill wage premiums via improving profits and hence labor
productivity of firms.
4.3.2 Further Robust Estimates
In this section, we include some additional robustness checks in the estimation using both
cross-sectional and panel data. Skills are categorized by education in our previous estimation.
In this part, we re-estimate the empirical model with the skill share categorized by occupation.
The NBS dataset reports seven occupations of employees: Senior engineers, intermediate en-
gineers, primary engineers, senior technicians, technicians, specialized workers and ordinary
workers. According to the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO), we
define the engineers and technicians as skilled labor. The average skill share of Chinese man-
ufacturing firms by occupation turns to be 0.134 in 2004, which is slightly lower than the skill
share categorized by education. The estimation results with alternative skill share are shown
in column (1) of Table (9). The coefficient of interaction between FVAR and the alternative
skill share by occupation is positive and statistically significant. It indicates firms with higher
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Table 8: Robustness Checks with Labor Productivity and Profit









(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln unskilled wage -0.792 -1.487** -0.118** -0.120*
(0.743) (0.724) (0.055) (0.065)
FVAR -0.202*** 0.103*** -0.841*** 1.378***
(0.069) (0.037) (0.162) (0.095)
Upstreamness -0.253*** -0.087*** -0.148*** -0.079***
(0.043) (0.025) (0.023) (0.011)
ln value-added per worker 0.033 -0.024
(0.051) (0.027)
ln profit per worker 0.053 -0.014
(0.037) (0.020)
skill share -0.644*** -0.570*** -0.209*** -0.218***
(0.060) (0.071) (0.030) (0.033)
ln size -0.121*** -0.025** -0.143*** 0.003
(0.021) (0.013) (0.011) (0.006)
age 0.001 0.034*** -0.018*** 0.008*
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005)
foreign ownership 0.025 0.043 0.243*** -0.144***
(0.058) (0.027) (0.048) (0.030)
processing -0.017 -0.316*** -0.088** -0.176***
(0.061) (0.033) (0.038) (0.016)
SOE 0.131 0.495*** 0.659*** 0.920***
(0.207) (0.100) (0.116) (0.082)
interaction with fvar 0.112*** 0.069*** 0.745*** 0.011***
(0.018) (0.013) (0.039) (0.001)
interaction with upstreamness 0.052*** 0.027*** 0.024*** 0.010***
(0.011) (0.008) (0.006) (0.004)
interaction with lnsize 0.034*** 0.017*** 0.044*** 0.017***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
interaction with age 0.010*** 0.004*** 0.011*** 0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
interaction with foreign -0.012 -0.040*** -0.144*** -0.111***
(0.015) (0.011) (0.012) (0.009)
interaction with processing -0.118*** -0.089*** -0.049*** -0.044***
(0.018) (0.015) (0.011) (0.007)
interaction with SOE 0.078 0.007 -0.016 -0.091***
(0.054) (0.036) (0.027) (0.022)
Constant 24498 20.417*** 8.545*** 8.613***
0.210 (6.193) (0.525) (0.609)
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 2.2e+04*** 1.8e+04***
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 3.0e+05*** 2.4e+05***
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic 1.2e+05*** 9.5e+04***
Year FE NO NO YES YES
Firm FE NO NO YES YES
Province-sector FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 24498 18485 125779 103159
R2 0.210 0.219 0.202 0.205
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗p < 0.01. Column (1)-(2) are OLS regression with
robust standard errors clustered at firm-level. Column(3)-(4) report the 2SLS regression results with the Heckman
corrected FVAR and one-year lagged upstreamness as instrument. The interacted terms are shown at the top of each
column.
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FVAR tend to be skilled-intensive and have large skill premium. The coefficient of upstream-
ness interacted with the alternative skill share is also significantly positive, confirming the fact
that upstream firms tend to use more skilled workers and have larger skill wage inequality than
downstream firms.
In the Column (2), we estimate the empirical model with alternative variables. As we know,
the unskilled wage is measured by the 25th percentile of the average wage by provinces [Chen
et al. (2017)]. In this part, we use the rural wage of provinces as an alternative indicator of un-
skilled wage 26. We also replace firms’ capita-labor intensity with their productivity measured
by the Olley and Pakes (1992)’s approach. The new regression results are shown in the second
column of the table (9). We observe the coefficients keep robust with alternative indicators.
Considering the heterogeneity of processing firms in FVAR, we rule out the processing firms
from the sample in column (3) and keep processing firms only in the estimation of column (4).
The estimation without processing firms is consistent with the baseline results in column (3)
that FVAR is positively associated with skill wage premium and upgrading in GVCs improves
skill wage premium with more skill workforces. However, the estimation with processing firms
in column (4) shows no significant impacts of GVC activities on skill wage premium in 2004.
We also include the alternative indicators of unskilled wage and the capital-labor ratio in the
regression of panel data between 2000 and 2006. The results are shown in the column (1) of
Table (10). The panel data is still regressed with 2SLS using the Heckman corrected FVAR
and the lagged one-period upstreamness as instruments. The results confirm that rising FVAR
increases skill share and enlarges wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labor. It also
conforms to our previous finding that upgrading in GVCs expands the skill wage inequality
with more skilled workforces. Similarly, we drop the processing firms from the sample and
re-estimate the empirical model in the column (2). The coefficients keep significant and robust
with ordinary companies. We also regress the model using only processing firms in the sample
and report the results in column (3). The results show that the coefficient of FVAR interacted
26The wage of rural areas of each province is collected from the China Rural Household Survey Yearbook,
which provides annual survey data of Chinese rural population
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Table 9: Further Robustness Using 2004 Data










ln unskilled wage -0.333 -0.192 0.938** 2.746***
(0.888) (0.134) (0.384) (0.594)
skill share -1.027*** -4.455*** -2.002*** -0.869
(0.342) (0.669) (0.394) (1.907)
FVAR 0.166*** 0.155*** 0.186*** -0.338***
(0.026) (0.025) (0.032) (0.075)
upstreamness -0.092*** -0.125*** -0.071*** -0.122**
(0.019) (0.018) (0.024) (0.048)
ln size -0.008 -0.043*** -0.030** -0.010
(0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.028)
ln K/L 0.038*** 0.054*** -0.059***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.018)
ln TFP by OP 2.509***
(0.066)
age 0.044*** 0.040*** 0.030*** 0.028***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005)
foreign 0.045** 0.121*** -0.083*** 0.227***




(0.092) (0.083) 0.475*** 0.479
skill share ×FVAR 0.278** 0.190* (0.097) (0.352)
(0.115) (0.108) 0.443*** 1.169
skill share ×upstreamness 0.261*** 0.376*** (0.131) (0.720)
(0.071) (0.065) 0.203** 0.108
skill share ×lnsize 0.088** 0.085** (0.085) (0.363)
(0.036) (0.035) 0.269*** 0.355
skill share ×age -0.021*** -0.016*** (0.045) (0.216)
(0.004) (0.004) 0.373*** 0.169
skill share ×lnK/L 0.289*** (0.038) (0.131)
(0.035) 0.052*** 0.067
skill share ×foreign -0.542*** -0.618*** (0.009) (0.044)
(0.097) (0.092) 0.001 -0.219
skill share ×processing -0.041 0.107 (0.114) (0.501)
(0.169) (0.154)
skill share ×SOE 0.256 0.338 -0.477 -3.535*
(0.248) (0.224) (0.381) (1.910)
skill share ×lntfpop 2.293***
(0.334)
Constant 10.103 4.303*** -1.126 -14.768***
(7.784) (0.924) (3.122) (5.142)
Province-sector FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 24338 24001 20484 3854
R2 0.205 0.292 0.234 0.172
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table 10: Further Robustness Checks Using 2000-2006 Panel Data









ln unskilled wage 0.485*** -0.046 0.697** -0.019
(0.089) (0.059) (0.339) (0.116)
skill share -4.850*** -1.549*** -1.682* -2.104***
(0.380) (0.219) (0.989) (0.589)
FVAR 0.990*** 1.939*** 1.240*** 2.013***
(0.063) (0.079) (0.191) (0.170)
upstreamness -0.104*** -0.065*** -0.069*** -0.145***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.027) (0.023)
lnsize -0.040*** -0.008 0.014 -0.015
(0.004) (0.005) (0.014) (0.011)
age 0.005 0.004 0.016*** 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
foreign ownership -0.043** -0.302*** 0.077 -0.357***
(0.020) (0.022) (0.047) (0.043)
processing -0.130*** -0.267***
(0.015) (0.030)
SOE 0.817*** 0.700*** 0.170 0.702***
(0.055) (0.056) (0.145) (0.064)
lnK/L -0.005 0.014 -0.031***
(0.005) (0.014) (0.010)
ln TFP by OP 2.327***
(0.186)
skill share ×FVAR 3.461*** 1.681*** 3.822** 1.633
(0.327) (0.406) (1.714) (1.214)
skill share ×upstreamness 0.351*** 0.301*** 0.154 0.318***
(0.021) (0.023) (0.209) (0.064)
skill share ×lnsize 0.351*** 0.301*** 0.187* 0.394***
(0.021) (0.023) (0.104) (0.112)
skill share ×lnK/L 0.364*** 0.293*** 0.480***
(0.024) (0.104) (0.073)
skill share ×age 0.092*** 0.099*** 0.071*** 0.120***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.024) (0.011)
skill share ×foreign -1.022*** -0.488*** -1.206*** -0.934***
(0.097) (0.110) (0.444) (0.311)
skill share ×processing -0.167 -0.297
(0.121) (0.275)
skill share ×SOE -0.964*** -0.900*** 2.204** -1.383***
(0.178) (0.186) (1.022) (0.366)
skill share ×lnTFP by OP 2.327***
(0.186)
Constant -0.601 7.928*** 2.418 7.441***
(0.735) (0.541) (2.670) (1.047)
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 1.3e+04*** 1.2e+04*** 1815.5*** 3567.529***
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 2.8e+05*** 2.4e+05*** 3.3e+04*** 5.9e+05***
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic 4.9e+04*** 4.1e+04*** 1.1e+04*** 1.9e+04***
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES YES
Province-sector FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 125554 111119 12411 23352
R2 0.278 0.210 0.165 0.240
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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with skill share of processing firms is significantly positive, suggesting rising FVAR is also
associated with higher wage inequality of skills within processing firms. However, we fail to
observe a significant impact of GVC upgrading on firm-level wage premium for the processing
firms.
Our sample period contains a special event that China entered the WTO on 11 December
2001. Entering WTO has boosted the process of China’s trade liberalization and deepened the
integration of China into the global economy. China’s tariff on manufacturing products was
lowered from 35% to 17% in the first five years. Moreover, the foreign producers, which were
forbidden to ship directly to Chinese firms, are allowed to export without the trade dealers since
2002. To ensure our results not driven by these factors, we add a placebo test that limits the
estimation in the pre-WTO period (2000-2001) in the column (4). The estimation of the sub-
sample shows that the coefficients are similar to the baseline results, suggesting entering WTO
has no significant effect on our results.
5 Conclusion
Despite the massive literature on trade and wage inequality, there are few studies on the
impacts of global value chains(GVCs), featured by vertical specialization and intermediate
trade, on wage inequality within firms. In this paper, we provide a theoretical and empirical
study on how participating and upgrading in GVCs affect the wage inequality between the
skilled and unskilled labor within firms. Inspired by Amiti and Davis (2011) and Chen et al.
(2017), we develop an open economy model of heterogeneous firms with intermediate input
trade and different types of skill inputs to investigate the wage premium changes associated
with firms’ GVC activities. Firms participate in the GVCs via importing intermediates for the
production of exports. Firms upgrade in the GVCs by moving from downstream sectors to more
upstream sectors. In this paper, skilled workers are assumed to have higher bargaining power
over wages than unskilled workers according to firms’ performance. Profitable firms tend to
pay higher wages to skilled labor. The model predicted that importing intermediates increase
firms’ profits and raises firms’ wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers. All else
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equal, firms which participate more in the GVCs tend to have higher profits with higher skill
wage inequality of skills. Moreover, moving to upstream sectors also enlarges the firm’s wage
inequality via improving the productivity of skilled workers.
Using detailed China’s firm- and transaction- level data during 2000-2006, we measure firms’
GVC participation index as the share of foreign value added in exports (FVAR) [Koopman et al.
(2014)]. We further estimate firms’ upstreamness as the proxy of GVC position. We observe a
declining share of foreign value-added content in exports (FVAR) for Chinese manufacturing
firms, which is consistent with the estimation of Kee and Tang (2016). We also find a rising
trend of upstreamness for Chinese manufacturing firms, suggesting the upgrading of GVC firms
in the GVCs. As the firm-level data of skills is only available in 2004, we follow Chen et al.
(2017) to develop a Mincer-type econometric approach to estimate the wage premium of firms.
The empirical results strongly support the model predictions, which are robust to different
robustness checks. We found that rising FVAR leads to an increase in the skill wage premium
of firms with more skilled workforces. Similarly, moving to more upstream sectors in GVCs
widens firms wage inequality of skills with higher skill share.
To the best our knowledge, this paper is the first one studying the impacts of GVC activities
on the wage inequality within firms. Our results have critical policy implications for develop-
ing countries. Using imported intermediates improves firms’ profits, but it also enlarges the
wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers at the same time. For most develop-
ing countries with rising FVAR, this result imposes a dilemma of deepening the integration
into GVCs and reducing the wage gaps of skills. Moreover, upgrading in GVCs imposes new
requirements for skilled workforces, which require emerging countries to align their human
capital development with the GVC upgrading demands. Developing countries should tailor
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